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Abstract
Over the years, numerous work-zone, portable sign support systems have been suc-
cessfully crash tested according to the Test Level 3 safety performance guidelines 
provided in the National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report 350 and 
accepted for use along our nation’s highways. For this study, several crashworthy 
sign support systems were analyzed to predict their safety performance according 
to the new evaluation criteria provided in the Manual for Assessing Safety Hard-
ware (MASH). More specifically, this analysis was conducted to determine which 
hardware parameters negatively affect a system’s safety performance. To verify the 
accuracy of the analysis, eight systems, four with the 2270P pickup truck and four 
with the 1100C small car, were evaluated according to the MASH criteria. Five out 
of the eight tested systems failed the MASH criteria, and the other three systems 
performed in an acceptable manner. As a result of the analysis and verification, sev-
eral hardware parameters were deemed critical for contributing to system failure 
under MASH and included sign panel material, top mast height, presence of flags, 
sign-locking mechanism type, base layout, and system orientation. Flowcharts were 
developed to assist manufacturers with the design of new sign support systems. 
Keywords: highway, field research, systems safety, factor analysis, work-zone de-
vice, crash test 
digitalcommons.unl.edu
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1. Introduction 
The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 350, 
Recommended Procedures for the Safety Performance Evaluation of High-
way Features (Ross, Sicking, Zimmer, & Michie, 1993), set forth the first 
guidelines for the safety performance of work-zone traffic control devices. 
This document recommended that work-zone traffic control devices should 
be subjected to two full-scale crash tests with a small passenger car. From 
1998 through the present, numerous full-scale vehicle crash tests have been 
conducted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln on work-zone traffic con-
trol devices, such as plastic drums, barricades, portable sign support sys-
tems, and rigid-panel sign support systems (Polivka, Rohde, Faller, & Sicking, 
2002). References of all previous testing can be found in Schmidt (2009) and 
Schmidt, Sicking, Lechtenberg, Faller, and Holloway (2010). Many of these 
work-zone devices were deemed crashworthy and have been accepted by the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). If a device showed a propensity to 
penetrate into the vehicle’s occupant compartment, NCHRP Report 350 rec-
ommended consideration for an additional crash test to be conducted with 
a pickup truck. However, because a pickup truck test was not specifically 
required, this test was never conducted, even when occupant compartment 
penetration was the primary safety concern. 
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Offi-
cials (AASHTO; 2009) published the Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware 
(MASH), which replaced NCHRP Report 350 as the new safety performance 
guidelines used for evaluating roadside safety devices. According to MASH, 
all new work-zone traffic control devices must be crash tested with a small 
car and a full-size pickup truck. Previously, work-zone sign support sys-
tems were specifically developed to meet the NCHRP Report 350 safety per-
formance guidelines utilizing only the 820-kg small car impact condition. 
Therefore, certain hardware parameters of current crashworthy sign sup-
port systems may cause these devices to have an unacceptable safety per-
formance when impacted with larger vehicles. Most of the sign support sys-
tems accepted under NCHRP Report 350 were designed to either bridge the 
windshield and strike the roof or to breakaway and pass over the top of the 
vehicle without contacting the windshield. However, this behavior was de-
pendent upon an impact with the front-end profile of an 820-kg small car. 
Vehicles with longer or taller front-end profiles could allow the sign system 
to contact the windshield and produce an undesirable behavior. Therefore, 
the devices found in work zones along the National Highway System (NHS) 
may not be crashworthy for all vehicles larger than the 820-kg small car. As 
a result, additional research was needed to determine the magnitude of this 
potential safety problem. 
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One of the research objectives for this study was to evaluate the safety 
performance of selected, crashworthy, sign support systems accepted under 
NCHRP Report 350 to determine whether these systems would likely meet 
the MASH safety performance criteria. A further objective of the study was 
to develop general guidelines for determining which design characteristics 
produce an increased risk for penetrating the occupant compartment on a 
wide range of passenger vehicles. 
The research effort began with an analytical study of prior full-scale and 
bogie vehicle crash tests of sign support systems. These crash tests were cat-
egorized by their predicted methods of failure under MASH by comparing 
observed sign and mast trajectories from tests with small cars to other ve-
hicle geometries. The accuracy of this method was evaluated through full-
scale crash testing of selected sign systems that were predicted to have a 
high propensity for failure. Four full-scale crash tests were performed, two 
with a small car sedan and two with a pickup truck. Two sign support sys-
tems were impacted within each test run, thus resulting in the evaluation 
of eight systems. The test results were then compared to the predicted be-
havior. Recommendations were provided to assist manufacturers and high-
way engineers in designing and implementing safer sign support systems 
that will accommodate impacts from a broad range of passenger vehicles. 
2. System Analysis 
For this study, it was necessary to predict whether each of the previously 
crash-tested, sign support systems would perform in an acceptable man-
ner with the MASH criteria. Therefore, the front-end dimensions were com-
pared for typical test vehicles specified in NCHRP Report 350 and MASH. The 
1100C small car had a longer hood length, a smaller windshield incline, and 
a shorter windshield length than the 820C small car. Thus, the impact area 
of the windshield was set back slightly and was smaller than that configured 
for the 820C. On the other hand, the 2270P pickup truck had a smaller wind-
shield incline and longer windshield length than the 2000P pickup truck. 
Thus, the impact area of the windshield was larger for the 2270P. The hood 
length was also shorter on the 2270P pickup truck, and the front profile was 
slightly taller than the 2000P pickup truck. Using vehicle geometries as well 
as previous crash test videos and photographs, the research team predicted 
how each sign support system would perform according to the MASH TL-3 
evaluation criteria when impacted by an 1100C small car and a 2270P pickup 
truck at 100 km/h. 
Previously crash-tested, sign support systems were analyzed, including 92 
small car full-scale crash tests using the NCHRP Report 350 criteria, 65 small 
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car bogie tests, and 18 pickup truck bogie tests (Schmidt, 2009; Schmidt et 
al., 2010). A ranking from 1 to 4, as shown in Table 1, was given to each sign 
support system based on its predicted chance of failing the MASH evaluation 
criteria. Each system ranking was paired with the failure modes shown in 
Table 2. The methods of failure were the same for NCHRP Report 350 and 
MASH; however, most of the evaluation criteria were more objectively de-
fined in MASH. 
After failure prediction and crash-test video review, the research team se-
lected 19 hardware parameters that were deemed to contribute to the safety 
performance of sign support systems. A hardware parameter for a sign sup-
port system was described as a mechanism, geometrical measurement, or a 
particular property associated with a system component. The selected hard-
ware parameters were base layout, base connection type, height to bottom 
of sign, height to top of mast, height to top of flags, base/sign holder verti-
cal tubing cross-sectional dimension, base/sign holder vertical tubing length, 
base/sign holder vertical tubing wall thickness, number of mast stages, mast 
material, mast cross-sectional dimension, mast wall thickness, sign-locking 
mechanism, sign panel material, aluminum vertical cross-brace length, fi-
berglass vertical cross-brace thickness, horizontal cross-brace thickness, flag 
staff material, and system orientation. System orientation was included as 
a hardware parameter, because it was the only test-related parameter that 
varied. These 19 hardware parameters were later disaggregated into 142 sub 
parameters, which were used to categorize similar sign support systems dur-
ing the analysis. As an example, sub parameters for sign panel material in-
cluded aluminum, plywood, vinyl, mesh, and plastic. 
Table 1. Predicted chance of failing Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware





Table 2. Actual and predicted performance methods of failure
Method of Failure  Description
1  Severe windshield cracking and failure
2  Windshield indention
3  Obstruction of driver visibility
4  Windshield penetration
5  Other occupant compartment penetration
6  Roof deformation
7  Test invalid due to flying debris
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An analysis was conducted to determine which sub parameter combina-
tions would result in the greatest risk of failure for sign support systems 
using the MASH guidelines. A total of 175 and 157 systems were analyzed 
to estimate the safety performance with pickup trucks and small cars, re-
spectively, and included NCHRP Report 350 successes and failures. Only the 
most critical methods of failure were analyzed and included windshield pen-
etration, other occupant compartment penetration, and roof deformation. 
Further, only systems that were predicted to fail 50% to 100% of the time 
(Rank 1 or 2) were analyzed. 
A methodology was applied to determine the importance of hardware pa-
rameters. If a sub parameter corresponded with 50% or more of predicted 
system failures for either vehicle type, then its associated hardware pa-
rameter was considered to be important. Hardware parameters that were 
deemed important for both vehicles were sign panel material, height to the 
top of the mast, mast stages, mast material, flag staff material, and system 
orientation. For the small car, additional important hardware parameters 
were height to the top of the flags and sign-locking mechanism. Another im-
portant hardware parameter for only the pickup truck was base layout. All 
other hardware parameters were considered to be unimportant and were 
discarded from the analysis. 
Specific sub parameters that were predicted to cause the most failures 
with the MASH pickup truck were a top mast height of 1,905 to 3,353 mm, 
a two-staged mast, a steel mast, an aluminum sign panel, the use of wood-
dowel flag staffs or the nonuse of flags, a 0-degree system orientation, and 
an X-footprint base layout. Specific sub parameters that were predicted to 
cause the most failures with the MASH small car were a top mast height 
of 1,499 to 2,794 mm, a two-staged mast, a steel mast, an aluminum sign 
panel, no flags, a 0-degree system orientation, and a nut and bolt sign-lock-
ing mechanism. 
To determine specific systems that had a high rate of failure, systems 
were analyzed based on the importance of hardware parameters. Separate 
analyses were conducted for system impacts with the small car and the 
pickup truck. For each vehicle, systems were sorted by combinations of three 
of the important hardware parameters. All combinations consisted of sub-
parameters with the highest rates of predicted failure with the MASH crite-
ria. All of the combinations that were determined to be critical are shown 
in Table 3. 
Systems were selected for full-scale crash testing if they were FHWA 
accepted, matched the parameters shown in Table 3, and were common 
systems found in the marketplace. The final test matrix was configured 
after considering input by the FHWA. Due to limitations on the different 
types of sign support systems previously tested at the Midwest Roadside 
Safety Facility (MwRSF), the FHWA recommended sign support systems that 
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incorporated specific important hardware parameters and those that were 
believed to be critical for failure with either the small car or pickup truck 
vehicles. Further details on this project have been omitted but are described 
in the noted references (Schmidt, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2010). 
3. Work-Zone Sign Support Systems 
A total of eight work-zone traffic control devices were crash tested under 
this study, as shown in Table 4 and Figure 1. These crash tests were con-
ducted on prior FHWA-accepted, NCHRP Report 350-crashworthy, work-
zone sign support systems. 
For each test, two sign support systems were impacted with one vehi-
cle. The two systems were longitudinally placed approximately 18 m apart 
and offset to impact the left- and right-front quarter points of the vehicle. 
MwRSF researchers, in consultation with FHWA personnel, chose to not de-
liberately divulge the system names or manufacturers of the proprietary 
devices to reduce the propensity for the unapproved use of unsatisfactory 
test results. 
Table 3. Recommended test matrix—Sign support systems 
Pickup Truck Recommendations  Small Car Recommendations
X-footprint, double vertical spring, top of  X-footprint, double vertical spring, top of
 mast 2,286 mm, bottom of sign 457 mm,   mast 2,388 mm, bottom of sign 457 mm,
 flags, vinyl or aluminum panel, 0◦ or 90◦  flags, aluminum or vinyl panel, 0◦
Parallel dual upright, top of mast 2,184  Parallel dual upright, top of mast
 mm, bottom of sign 381–610 mm, no   2,134–2,743 mm, bottom of sign 381–610
 flags, aluminum panel, 0◦  mm, no flags, aluminum panel, 0◦ or 90◦
X-footprint, torsion spring, top of mast  X-footprint, torsion spring, top of mast
 2,286 mm, bottom of sign 305–457 mm,   2,286 mm, bottom of sign 305–381 mm,
 flags, aluminum or vinyl panel, 0◦  flags, vinyl panel, 0◦ or 90◦
X-footprint, double vertical spring, top of  X-footprint, rigid base, no mast, bottom of
 mast 3,302 mm, bottom of sign   sign 457 mm, flags, vinyl panel with
 1,524 mm, flags, aluminum panel, 90◦  aluminum cross-bracing, 0◦
Parallel dual upright, top of mast  Parallel dual upright, top of mast
 3,302 mm, bottom of sign 1,524 mm, no   1,524–2,108 mm, bottom of sign 457–
 flags, aluminum panel, 90◦  914 mm, no flags, aluminum panel, 0◦
X-footprint, slipbase, top of mast
 3,302 mm, bottom of sign 1,524 mm,
 flags, aluminum panel, 0◦ or 90◦
Source: Schmidt (2009).
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Table 4. Final test matrix—sign support systems
Test No.  System No.    System Description
WZ09-1  1A  Double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign support,
   aluminum sign panel, 90-degree impact with 2270P
WZ09-1  1B  Parallel dual upright sign support, aluminum sign
   panel, amber warning light, sandbag on each leg,
   90-degree impact with 2270P
WZ09-2  2A  Double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign support,
   aluminum sign panel, 0-degree impact with 1100C
WZ09-2  2B  Tripod-mounted sign support, aluminum sign panel,
   90-degree impact with 1100C
WZ09-3  3A  Double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign support,
   roll-up sign panel, 0-degree impact with 2270P
WZ09-3  3B  Double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign support,
   aluminum sign panel, 90-degree impact with 2270P
WZ09-4  4A  Double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign support,
   aluminum sign panel, 0-degree impact with 1100C
WZ09-4  4B  Dual extension, spring-mounted sign support, roll-up
   sign panel, 90-degree impact with 1100C
Figure 1. Work-zone sign support systems: (a) System 1A, (b) System 1B, (c) System 2A, (d) 
System 2B, (e) System 3A, (f) System 3B, (g) System 4A, and (h) System 4B.
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4. Evaluation Criteria
All newly developed work-zone traffic control devices, such as portable 
sign support systems, must satisfy impact safety standards provided 
in MASH (AASHTO, 2009) to be accepted by the FHWA for use along 
the NHS. According to FHWA’s Submission Guidelines attached to the 
July 1997 memorandum, Action: Identifying Acceptable Highway Safety 
Features (FHWA, 1997), work-zone traffic control devices fall into Cat-
egory 2. Devices in this hardware category are not expected to produce 
a significant change in vehicular velocity. However, these devices may 
still pose safety risks to motorists because they have the potential to 
penetrate a windshield, injure a worker, or cause vehicle instability 
when driven over or lodged under a vehicle.
According to TL-3 of MASH, work-zone traffic control devices must 
be subjected to three full-scale vehicle crash tests. The three full-scale 
crash tests are as follows:
1. Test designation no. 3-70 consisting of a 1,100-kg small 
car, designated 1100C, impacting at a nominal speed of 30 
km/h and at a critical impact angle (CIA).
2. Test designation no. 3-71 consisting of a 1,100-kg small car, 
designated 1100C, impacting at a speed of 100 km/h and 
at a CIA.
3. Test designation no. 3-72 consisting of a 2,270-kg pickup 
truck, designated 2270P, impacting at a speed of 100 km/h 
and at a CIA.
The low-speed test is intended to evaluate the breakaway, fracture, 
or yielding mechanism of the device. The high-speed test is intended 
to evaluate vehicular stability, test article trajectory, and occupant 
risk factors. Because most work-zone traffic control devices have a 
relatively small mass (less than 100 kg), the high-speed crash test is 
more critical due to the propensity of the test article to penetrate into 
the occupant compartment. Therefore, test designation no. 3-70 was 
deemed unnecessary for this project. In addition, testing should be 
conducted at the critical impact angle, which is the worst-case impact 
condition in which the traffic control device will be deployed along 
the roadway. For safety devices that can be used near an intersection 
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and can be impacted from virtually any direction, testing is recom-
mended at 90 degrees from normal and at the most critical orientation 
between 0 and 25 degrees.
Evaluation criteria for full-scale vehicle crash testing are based on 
three appraisal areas: (1) structural adequacy, (2) occupant risk, and 
(3) vehicle trajectory after collision. Criteria for structural adequacy 
are intended to evaluate the ability of the work-zone traffic control 
device to break away, fracture, or yield in a predictable manner. Oc-
cupant risk evaluates the degree of hazard to occupants in the im-
pacting vehicle, including windshield damage. Vehicle trajectory after 
collision is a measure of the potential for the postimpact trajectory of 
the vehicle to cause subsequent multivehicle accidents, thereby sub-
jecting occupants of other vehicles to undue hazards or to subject the 
occupants of the impacting vehicle to secondary collisions with other 
vehicles and/or fixed objects. The full-scale vehicle crash tests were 
conducted and reported in accordance with the procedures provided 
in MASH for Category 2 devices.
Windshield damage is a major area of concern when evaluating 
the safety performance of a work-zone traffic control device (FHWA, 
2009). The windshield should not be shattered nor damaged in such 
a way that visibility is significantly obstructed. Minor chipping and 
cracking of the windshield is acceptable. Indentation of the windshield 
by greater than 76 mm, a tear in the plastic liner or penetration of the 
test article through the windshield is not permitted. Also, roof deformation 
greater than 102 mm and any other occupant compartment penetration are 
not permitted. 
5. Full-Scale Crash Tests 
5.1. Test No. WZ09-1 
The 2,340-kg pickup truck with a simulated occupant seated in the right-
front seat impacted system no. 1A, a double-coil, spring-mounted sign sup-
port with an aluminum sign panel, oriented end-on to the vehicle, at a speed 
of 102.1 km/h and at an angle of 90 degrees. During test no. WZ09-1A, the 
mast fractured away from the base and the sign panel disengaged from the 
lower rigid bracket and penetrated the windshield with a maximum inden-
tation of 330 mm. In addition, the flags disengaged and the flag holder pen-
etrated the roof and caused 95 mm of roof crush, as shown in Figure 2. The 
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performance of system no. 1A was determined to be unacceptable according 
to the MASH criteria due to roof and windshield penetration, windshield in-
dentation greater than 76 mm, and significant windshield cracking. Occu-
pant impact velocity (OIV) and occupant ride down acceleration (ORA) were 
not calculated due to the small change in velocity. 
The pickup truck then impacted system no. 1B, a parallel dual upright 
sign support with an aluminum sign panel and amber warning light, ori-
ented end-on to the vehicle at a speed of 99.8 km/h and at an angle of 90 
degrees. During test no. WZ09-1B, both masts fractured and the sign sup-
port rotated onto the hood. Subsequently, the sign panel and attached warn-
ing light rotated into the windshield, penetrated the windshield, and caused 
229 mm of windshield indentation, as shown in Figure 2. The performance 
of system no. 1B was determined to be unacceptable according to the MASH 
criteria due to windshield penetration, windshield indentation greater than 
76 mm, and significant windshield cracking. OIV and ORA were not calcu-
lated due to the small change in velocity. 
5.2. Test No. WZ09-2 
The 1,167-kg small car with a simulated occupant seated in the right-front 
seat impacted system no. 2A, a double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign 
support with an aluminum sign panel, oriented head-on to the vehicle, at a 
speed of 103.2 km/h and at an angle of 0 degrees. During test no. WZ09-2A, 
the mast fractured and the sign panel disengaged into the windshield and 
caused 57 mm of windshield indentation, as shown in Figure 3. The perfor-
mance of system no. 2A was determined to be successful according to the 
MASH criteria, because the maximum deformation of 57 mm was below the 
76 mm maximum value defined in MASH. OIV and ORA were not calculated 
due to the small change in velocity. 
The small car then impacted system no. 2B, a tripod-mounted sign sup-
port with an aluminum sign panel, oriented end-on to the vehicle at a speed 
Figure 2. Vehicle damage, test no. WZ09-1: (a) System 1A windshield, (b) System 1A roof, 
and (c) System 1B windshield.
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of 98.8 km/h and at an angle of 90 degrees. During test no. WZ09-2B, the 
sign stand rotated onto the hood and the flag holder and mast penetrated 
the windshield with a maximum indentation of 197 mm and 19 mm of roof 
crush, as shown in Figure 3. In addition, the flags fractured inside the car. 
The performance of system no. 2B was determined to be unacceptable ac-
cording to the MASH criteria due to significant windshield cracking, wind-
shield indentation greater than 76 mm, and windshield penetration. The 
mast impacted the top of the windshield which was already weakened from 
the impact with system no. 2A, but the penetration was significant and was 
believed to have occurred without the prior damage. OIV and ORA were not 
calculated due to the small change in velocity. 
5.3. Test No. WZ09-3 
The 1,168-kg small car with a simulated occupant seated in the right-front 
seat impacted system no. 3A, a double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign 
support with a vinyl roll-up sign panel oriented head-on to the vehicle, at 
a speed of 106.1 km/h and at an angle of 0 degrees. During test no. WZ09-
3A, the mast fractured and the sign panel disengaged into the windshield 
and caused 102 mm of windshield indentation, as shown in Figure 4. The 
performance of system no. 3A was determined to be unacceptable accord-
ing to the MASH criteria due to significant windshield cracking and wind-
shield indentation greater than 76 mm. OIV and ORA were well below the 
recommended limits. 
Figure 3. Vehicle damage, test no. WZ09-2: (a) System 2A, and (b) System 2B.
Figure 4. Vehicle damage, test no. WZ09-3: (a) System 3A, and (b) System 3B.
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The small car then impacted system no. 3B, a double-upright coil, spring-
mounted sign support with an aluminum sign panel oriented end-on to the 
vehicle at a speed of 100.9 km/h and at an angle of 90 degrees. During test 
no. WZ09-3B, the upper and lower masts separated and the horizontal cross-
brace impacted the windshield and caused 57 mm of windshield indentation, 
as shown in Figure 4. The performance of system no. 3B was determined to 
be acceptable according to the MASH criteria because the maximum defor-
mation of the windshield was only 57 mm, which is below the 76 mm maxi-
mum value defined in MASH. Windshield cracking was insufficient to cause 
obstruction of visibility, and the horizontal fiberglass cross-brace did not 
appear to have the potential for windshield penetration. OIV and ORA were 
well below the recommended limits. 
5.4. Test No. WZ09-4 
The 2,339-kg pickup truck with a simulated occupant seated in the right-front 
seat impacted system no. 4A, a double-upright coil, spring-mounted sign sup-
port with an aluminum sign panel oriented head-on to the vehicle, at a speed 
of 105.9 km/h and at an angle of 0 degrees. During test no. WZ09-4A, the con-
nection between the lower and upper masts failed, the sign panel impacted 
the hood, and the flag holder penetrated the windshield and caused 10 mm 
of windshield indentation. In addition, one of the front legs penetrated the 
floorboard behind the driver’s seat, as shown in Figure 5. The performance 
of system no. 4A was determined to be unacceptable according to the MASH 
criteria due to windshield and floorboard penetration and post impact vehicle 
trajectory. It should be noted that one of the legs on system no. 4A wedged be-
hind the right-front tire that inhibited the braking system on the pickup truck. 
This caused the pickup truck to veer to the right and impact a concrete barrier 
prior to stopping. This result could be considered a danger to workers in the 
work-zone area as well as to the occupants of vehicle depending on what ob-
jects would have been located on the right side of the roadway. OIV and ORA 
were not calculated due to the small change in velocity. 
Figure 5. Vehicle damage, test no. WZ09-4: (a) System 4A windshield, (b) System 4A floor-
board, and (c) System 4B hood.
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The pickup truck then impacted system no. 4B, a dual-extension, spring-
mounted sign support with a vinyl roll-up sign panel oriented end-on to the 
vehicle at a speed of 103.7 km/h and at an angle of 90 degrees. During test 
no. WZ09-4B, the sign panel impacted the hood and disengaged from the 
rigid brackets, the connection between the lower and upper masts failed, 
and the system rotated over the truck without further contact, as shown in 
Figure 5. System no. 4B was determined to be acceptable according to the 
MASH criteria because the components of system no. 4B did not contact the 
pickup truck’s windshield or roof. OIV and ORA were not calculated due to 
the small change in velocity. 
6. Discussion 
Following the crash testing program, the hardware parameters that were 
predicted to be important for failure were reevaluated to determine their 
actual contribution to system performance. The following hardware param-
eters are discussed in this section: aluminum sign panels, height to top of 
mast, two-staged masts, mast materials, presence of flags, X-footprint base 
layout, and rigid bracket sign-locking mechanism. 
Aluminum sign panels were shown to be important for the pickup truck 
and small car. Four of the six aluminum-panel systems failed. When ori-
ented at 90 degrees, the sharp corners on the rigid panels penetrated the 
windshield and deformed the roof (system no. 1A). The aluminum sign pan-
els flexed and disengaged upon impact when oriented at 0 degrees, which 
caused excessive windshield deformation and cracking (system no. 3a).
Not only is the sign panel material important, the reflective sheeting on 
the face of the aluminum may decrease the safety performance of a system. 
System nos. 2A and 3A were nearly identical sign support systems, except 
that system no. 2A had a blank aluminum sign panel, and system no. 3A had 
an aluminum sign panel with reflective sheeting. The system with reflec-
tive sheeting caused 102 mm of windshield deformation and remained intact 
with the windshield after the impact, whereas the system without reflec-
tive sheeting only caused 57 mm of indentation and the panel slid over the 
windshield and roof of the vehicle. The friction between the reflective sheet-
ing and the windshield may have contributed to the additional deformation. 
The critical range for the height to the top of the mast was predicted to 
be 1,905 to 3,353 mm for the pickup truck. Three of the four systems were 
in this critical range, and two of the three failed the MASH criteria. System 
no. 1A was 84 mm above the critical range and failed the MASH criteria with 
significant windshield penetration, so it is evident that the range should be 
extended with an upward bound of at least 3,437 mm. 
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All sign support systems that were crash tested with small cars were in 
the critical range for the height to the top of the mast, which was predicted 
to be 1,499 to 2,794 mm. For sign systems at the lower part of the range, the 
mast penetrated the windshield (system no. 2B). For sign systems at the up-
per part of the range, the sign panel caused excessive windshield deforma-
tion and cracking (system no. 3B). 
All systems, except for system no. 2B, were classified as having two-stage 
masts, which was predicted to be critical for the small car and pickup truck. 
Four of the seven systems with two-stage masts failed the MASH criteria. 
Most common sign systems were designed with two-stage masts for easier 
storage and portability, and the number of stages was not dependent on the 
height of the system. Because the height of the mast has shown to be very 
important factor on the performance of sign systems, the number of mast 
stages was determined to be insignificant. 
Steel mast material was predicted to be important for the pickup truck 
and the small car. Three of the five systems tested with steel masts failed 
the MASH criteria. However, two of the three systems that were tested with 
aluminum masts also failed the MASH criteria. In general, most masts with 
a low-breakaway point in work-zone devices tend to be made out of alumi-
num, whereas most non-breakaway masts or masts with a high-breakaway 
point tend to be made out of steel. System nos. 1B and 2B deformed around 
the hood of the vehicles and did not breakaway and then later penetrated 
the windshields. System no. 4B had a high-breakaway point, which allowed 
the base to get caught in the undercarriage of the pickup truck and pene-
trate the floorboard. System nos. 1A and 3A had low-breakaway points that 
fractured almost immediately upon impact, and the sign panels rotated into 
the vehicles’ windshields. So, it is more likely that the breakaway mecha-
nism or lack thereof is contributing to sign support system failure with the 
MASH criteria, rather than the mast material. 
The addition of the flags was inconclusive. Flags were present in seven 
of the eight systems. The flags in system no. 2B were the only flags that 
created a potential hazard when the flag staffs fractured inside the occu-
pant compartment. The flag holder, which was left exposed in system nos. 
1A and 4A when the flags disengaged or fractured, caused roof penetration 
and windshield penetration, respectively. Although the flag staff material 
and height to top of the flags was found to be important in the analysis, the 
presence or lack of flags was found to be more important during the crash 
tests. More importantly, the presence of a flag holder with no flags (or bro-
ken flag staffs) seemed to be the most critical situation, because the exposed 
metal ends have the potential to penetrate the windshield or roof. Each sys-
tem should be tested and used in the field in the same conditions, either with 
a flag holder and flags installed, or with no flag holder. 
Three of the four systems tested with the pickup truck had X-footprint 
base layouts, which were predicted to be critical. System no. 4A was oriented 
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at 0 degrees, and one of the legs penetrated the floorboard of the pickup 
truck. The legs of X-footprint bases are often intended to fold up for easy 
portability. However, the legs tend to release from their locked positions 
during vehicular impacts, thus allowing them to fold up into the undercar-
riage. This phenomenon did not occur when the system was oriented at 90 
degrees nor with the small car. 
The rigid bracket sign-locking mechanism was found to affect the per-
formance of systems tested with the small car. In system no. 3A, the rigid 
brackets disengaged the sign panel and caused the sign panel to indent the 
windshield. The rigid bracket with the flag holder on system no. 2B caused 
significant windshield penetration. The sign locking mechanism may be a 
contributor to failure of portable sign supports, but it is also dependent on 
the original design of the locking mechanism. Rigid brackets that were de-
signed to disengage the aluminum panel may produce an unsafe perfor-
mance if the panel impacts the windshield. However, rigid brackets that 
were designed to keep the aluminum panel intact may still allow the mast 
or sign panel to impact the windshield. The rigid bracket sign-locking mech-
anism that produces the safest performance should be analyzed for individ-
ual systems. 
System orientation was not an important hardware parameter indepen-
dently, because the performance of a system in either orientation is depen-
dent on the combination of other hardware parameters. Three of the five 
systems that were tested at the 90-degree orientation (system nos. 1A, 1B, 
and 2B) failed the MASH criteria by windshield penetration. Two of the three 
systems that were tested at the 0-degree orientation failed the MASH crite-
ria by excessive windshield deformation (system no. 3A) or windshield and 
floorboard penetration (system no. 4A). The most critical orientation for a 
system can be determined by evaluating all the hardware parameters on a 
given system. 
7. Conclusions 
A total of eight crash tests were conducted on various sign support systems 
that were predicted to fail the MASH criteria. Three of the work-zone traf-
fic control devices satisfactorily met the safety performance evaluation cri-
teria for one of the two required TL-3 crash tests set forth in MASH. These 
devices include: 
1. A double-upright coil, spring-mounted, sign support with an 
aluminum sign panel mounted at a height of 511 mm from the 
ground to the bottom of the sign panel impacted at a 0-degree 
orientation (System no. 2A - Test designation no. 3-71). 
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2. A dual-extension, spring-mounted, sign support with a vinyl roll-
up sign panel mounted at a height of 533 mm from the ground 
to the bottom of the sign panel impacted at a 90-degree orien-
tation (System no. 3B - Test designation no. 3-71). 
3. A double-upright coil, spring-mounted, sign support with an alu-
minum sign panel mounted at a height of 379 mm from the 
ground to the bottom of the sign panel impacted at a 90-degree 
orientation (System no. 4B - test designation no. 3-72). 
Five work-zone traffic control devices performed unsatisfactorily accord-
ing to the MASH evaluation criteria even though prior acceptable perfor-
mance was obtained according to NCHRP Report No. 350. These devices 
include: 
1. A double-upright coil, spring-mounted, sign support with an alu-
minum sign panel mounted at a height of 1,522 mm from the 
ground to the bottom of the sign panel impacted at a 90-degree 
orientation (System no. 1A - Test designation no. 3-72). 
2. A parallel dual upright sign support with an aluminum sign panel 
mounted at a height of 1,565 mm from the ground to the bottom 
of the sign panel impacted at a 90-degree orientation (System 
no. 1B - Test designation no. 3-72). 
3. A tripod-mounted, sign support with an aluminum sign panel 
mounted at a height of 373 mm from the ground to the bottom 
of the sign panel impacted at 90-degree orientation (System no. 
2B - Test designation no. 3-71). 
4. A double-upright coil, spring-mounted, sign support with an 
aluminum sign panel mounted at a height of 457 mm from the 
ground to the bottom of the sign panel impacted at a 0-degree 
orientation (System no. 3A - Test designation no. 3-71). 
5. A double-upright coil, spring-mounted, sign support with a vi-
nyl roll-up sign panel mounted at a height of 340 mm from the 
ground to the bottom of the sign panel impacted at a 0-degree 
orientation (System no. 4A - Test designation no. 3-72). 
The safety performance of sign support systems is a function of many 
hardware parameters, such as the stiffness and strength of the mast and 
stand, height of sign panel and mast, sign panel material, and flag and light 
attachments. Consequently, slight differences in system details can poten-
tially lead to very different results. Extreme care should be taken when at-
tempting to categorize similar products from various manufacturers. Full-
scale crash testing is the only way to verify the safety performance of a 
particular device. 
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The research conducted and described herein was not comprehensive of 
all work-zone traffic control devices. Therefore, the results cannot be used 
to predict acceptance nor failure of a particular work-zone traffic control de-
vice. The methodology utilized for categorizing and sorting the work-zone 
systems was specifically tailored for use in the crash testing program for this 
project. It should be noted that there are other existing sign support systems 
that were not analyzed within this study that would also have the potential 
to fail the MASH evaluation criteria. 
The breakaway mechanism (or lack thereof) is a key component of sign 
support systems that affects where and how the mast and/or sign panel will 
strike the vehicle. This feature was not considered as an independent hard-
ware parameter within this study, because breakaway sign support systems 
do not always behave as they were intended to, and some sign systems do 
not result in mast fracture or sign panel release upon impact. Therefore, it 
was difficult to classify sign support systems as breakaway or non-break-
away when they may not perform as originally intended. In general, the 
breakaway mechanism (or lack thereof) needs to be analyzed on individual 
systems in conjunction with other hardware parameters to determine if it is 
beneficial or detrimental to the safety performance of the system. 
8. Recommendations 
All of the crash-tested systems had previously passed the TL-3 small car cri-
teria defined in NCHRP Report 350. Therefore, it was expected that the sys-
tems tested in this study using the MASH small car could also perform sat-
isfactorily, because there were only slight changes in vehicle geometries. 
Unfortunately, two out of the four systems tested with the 1100C small car 
vehicle failed the MASH criteria. Thus, it is recommended that existing sys-
tems with a marginal pass under NCHRP Report 350, those similar to the 
two systems that failed the MASH criteria or those systems exhibiting any 
of the small car hardware parameters shown in Table 5 should be tested un-
der MASH using test designation no. 3-71 to verify their safety performance. 
Table 5. Hardware parameters believed to be important for failure
Hardware Parameter  Pickup Truck   Small Car
Sign panel material  Aluminum   Aluminum
Height to top of mast  1,905–3,429 mm   1,499–2,794 mm
Presence of flags   w/o Flags   w/ and w/o Flags
Orientation   0 and 90 degrees   0 and 90 degrees
Sign-locking mechanism  NA    Rigid brackets
Base layout   X-footprint   NA
Source: Schmidt (2009).
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No sign support systems have been full-scale crash tested with a pickup 
truck prior to this study. Thus, it is recommended that existing systems that 
are similar to those tested herein or designs exhibiting any of the pickup 
truck hardware parameters shown in Table 5 be tested under MASH using 
test designation no. 3-72 to verify their safety performance. 
Sign support systems with rigid panels should be crash tested using the 
same configuration that will be used in the field. As such, the sign blanks 
shall be covered with the actual reflective sheeting when used in crash test-
ing programs to obtain the most accurate results. 
The results from this research study demonstrated that sign support sys-
tems that were successfully crash tested under NCHRP Report 350 may not 
necessarily meet the MASH impact safety standards. All new sign support 
systems are required to be subjected to full-scale crash testing with small car 
and pickup truck vehicles when using the MASH safety performance guide-
lines. Manufacturers are cautioned when designing new systems with the 
hardware parameters shown in Table 5, as the inclusion of these parameters 
have shown an increased risk for system hardware to penetrate the occu-
pant compartment. The use of these hardware parameters has demonstrated 
the potential for systems to fail the MASH criteria, especially when those 
parameters were used in conjunction with one another. Specific combina-
tions of parameters that have been evaluated with the MASH criteria have 
been presented in flowcharts, such as the flowchart shown in Figure 6, and 
are provided in the noted references (Schmidt, 2009; Schmidt et al., 2010). 
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Figure 6. TL-3 Manual for Assessing Safety Hardware impact prediction with small car –X-
footprint base. Source: Schmidt (2009).
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